Tying of aid reversed: alternative incentive schemes for development aid, productivity enhancement and change of income distribution by Ziesemer, T.H.W.
  
 
Tying of aid reversed: alternative incentive schemes
for development aid, productivity enhancement and
change of income distribution
Citation for published version (APA):
Ziesemer, T. H. W. (1996). Tying of aid reversed: alternative incentive schemes for development aid,
productivity enhancement and change of income distribution. (MERIT Research Memoranda; No. 001).
Maastricht: MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/1996
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
1TYING OF AID REVERSED: ALTERNATIVE INCENTIVE SCHEMES FOR
DEVELOPMENT AID, PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT AND CHANGE OF INCOME
DISTRIBUTION*
Thomas Ziesemer, Rijksuniversiteit Limburg Maastricht, Department
of Economics and MERIT.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with a normative issue of development aid, the
grant element1 of official financial flows: Which way should it
be paid?2
One current practice is to tie aid to spending (at special
goods) in donor countries (Cashel-Cordo/Craig, 1990, section
2.1). Possible distributional paradoxes and inefficiencies of
tying have been investigated in standard trade models under
different assumptions about the manner of spending and financing
by governments (Kemp/Kojima, 1985, 1986) and effectively
constrained spending of the private sector (Schweinberger, 1990).
The most straightforward way out in search of Pareto optimality
is to finance aid lump sum3, let it be spent un-tied and
according to the preferences of the private sector.
However, there is a second strand of criticism of aid in the
literature. The effectiveness4 of development aid has been
severely criticized on three economic grounds. Firstly, its
impact on the rate of growth is at best inconclusive in empirical
investigations (Mosley/Hudson/Horrell, 1987). Secondly, poverty
is still widespread and the effects of aid have been unable to
outweigh other adverse circumstances (Cohen/Grindle/Walker,
1985), raising the question: has it been helpful at all? Thirdly,
aid is seen to produce and reinforce dependence of the recipient
(Griffin, 1970).
A Pareto efficient mode of paying aid does not, of course,
guarantee poverty alleviation, although this may be the declared
goal of donors. If no payment scheme can be found which makes
1 The intention in this paper is to isolate the aid question
from the problems of the debt crisis, with which we shall deal
elsewhere.
2For a broader discussion of development aid see the paper
by Helmut Wagner in this volume and on the background of this
paper Jepma (1991).
3 A payment is defined to be ’lump sum’ if the amount paid
does not depend on the behaviour of the recipient.
4The word ’efficiency’ is used in the sense of Pareto
optimality. ’Effectiveness’ indicates the impact on the level or
the growth rate of the GDP or GNP.
2this goal feasible in a Pareto efficient manner, a different
incentive scheme becomes necessary, one which violates the Pareto
efficiency requirement. Or, to put it differently, access to
concessional resources may come at the price of having to follow
the directives of donors (Cashel-Cordo/Craig, 1990, p.18).5
The purpose of this paper is to provide an example of an
incentive scheme that alleviates poverty within the framework of
a neoclassical growth model or increases the rate of growth
within the framework of a Harrod-Domar growth model and to
compare its effects on the three central variables outlined
above, poverty alleviation, the growth process and dependency,
with those of the lump sum paid aid which would follow the Pareto
criterion.
The main results concerning lump sum paid aid are as
follows. A lump-sum payment of aid, X, with an exogenous growth
rate f (where e is the exponential function and t the time index)
X = X0e
ft
, (1)
which always increases the welfare of the recipient country
according to the Pareto criterion, may lead to the following
results:
a) Ineffectiveness in regard to long-run growth if the rate of
growth of development aid is lower than the rate of growth of the
closed economy model in a Harrod-Domar framework (section 2) as
well as in the neoclassical growth model or in the latter if both
growth rates are equal. However, a golden rule may lead to a
recalculation of the rate of savings (section 4).
b) If the rate of growth of development aid is larger than the
growth rate of the corresponding closed economy model dependence
occurs (sections 2 and 4).
Therefore lump sum paid aid may be ineffective in regard to
poverty alleviation, long run growth rates and dependence.
If, however, development aid is not paid lump sum but as a
percentage x of the developing countries gross national product,
Y,6
X = xY (2)
the result is the following:
5See Wagner’s paper on conditionality in this volume.
6x may be different for each recipient country. For example
a poor country may have a larger x than a less poor country. As
only one country is considered in the models below no country
index is attached. In a slightly more complicate formulation, x
could be made dependent on the GNP of that country. This is not
done here for the mere sake of simplicity.
3c) This income-dependent aid raises the rate of growth in the
Harrod-Domar model (section 3) and the real wage rate of the
neoclassical model even if a golden rule7 recalculation adjusts
the savings rate (section 5).
This income-dependent incentive scheme produces an
excess burden on the recipient country but makes its wage earners
better off, thus making them independent of the distribution of
aid if compared to the case where aid is paid lump sum, provided
this gain is not completely taken away through taxation. However,
this can hardly be expected in the case of underdeveloped tax
administrations actually observed,, where systems of income tax
are not well developed or not stringently implemented. Such an
assumption would of course render all approaches to alleviating
the fate of the poor superfluous.
Hence, donors have the possibility to ensure that aid either
increases growth in the recipient country, if the Harrod-Domar
model comes close to reality, or, results in an improved income
distribution if the neoclassical model adequately mirrors the
growth process. A precondition for this is that donors shift from
lump sum, Pareto efficient aid which may leave the lot of the
poor unimproved, to an income-dependent, distribution- oriented
incentive scheme which increases real wages. Thus an
income-dependent incentive scheme may be superior either in
regard to growth or poverty without leading to dependence, if the
points of criticism mentioned above negatively enter the welfare
function of donors. As both schemes analyzed in this paper are
suggestions on reforming or revamping the current practice of
tied aid, the task is initially purely theoretical, designed to
trigger thinking about change.
2. Lump sum aid in the Harrod-Domar model
The production function - with K as the capital input and a as
a productivity parameter - is assumed to be
Y = aK (3)
Savings S, out of income as well as development aid X, finance
investment.
If development aid grows at a constant rate f according to
(1) and savings are a constant share, s, of income Y and aid X,
these finance capital formation, dK/dt, given by 8
.
K = s(aK + X0eft) (4)
7A ’golden rule’ indicates which behaviour allows for the
highest long-run per-capita consumption.
8A dot on a variable indicates its time derivative.
4One of the properties of lump-sum payments is that aid depends
no longer on certain project, but is at the free disposal of the
country.9 The asymptotic result of the solution of this simple
differential equation is10
^ ^
lim K = lim Y = Max [sa, f] (5)
t ∞ t ∞
In the long run the impact of development aid on the rate of
growth vanishes if the latter is smaller than the corresponding
rate of the closed economy model sa. However, if sa < f the
asymptotic rate of growth is completely donor determined, which
may be called dependent development. Thus if the intention of the
donor is to give aid until the receiving economy has matured, f
should be smaller than sa.
3. Income-dependent aid in the Harrod-Domar model
If development aid is paid according to (2) we obtain
.
K = s(1 + x)Y = s(1 + x)aK (4’)
instead of (4) and find the rate of growth
^
K = s(1 + x)a (5’)
If the rate of savings remains unchanged, income-dependent aid
increases the rate of growth of K and Y in such a way that per
capita incomes will grow faster. However, the question has always
been whether or not the savings ratio and the capital
productivity will remain unchanged (Griffin, 1970). Those who
claim that the rate of savings will adjust implicitly use some
framework of optimisation for the savings rate, the simplest of
which is the golden rule in the descriptive neoclassical growth
model. Therefore, we turn to this model now. However, if the rate
of savings is unchanged, in a Harrod-Domar-model the rate of
growth will be permanently higher under a scheme of
income-dependent aid and therefore more effective in regard to
9Recall that lump sum paid aid is a hypothetical alternative
to what is done in reality. It is this alternative which is
investigated here.
10A hat on a variable indicates a growth rate of that
variable.
5the rate of growth than lump sum aid, if f < s(1 + x)a.
4. Efficiency and effectiveness of lump-sum aid in the
neoclassical growth model
If investment is financed by savings and all aid is invested,
then lump-sum aid according to (1) yields
.
K = s(Y + X0eft) (4’’)
If output is produced in a linearly homogenous, neoclassical
production function, F, with labour input L and technology level
A,
Y = F(K, AL) (3’)
the central differential equation of the standard growth model
(for A0L0 = 1) becomes (n is the growth rate of AL)11
.
k = s[F(k,1) + X0e(f - n)t] - nk (6)
For each given value of k ≡ K/AL, a positive value of development
aid (X0e(f - n)t > 0) yields higher dk/dt than the closed model and
therefore arbitrary values of k will be reached faster. But in
the long run we have
 0 for f < n
lim X0e(f - n)t =  X0 for f = n
t ∞  ∞ for f > n
If aid grows at a lower rate than the closed economy, f < n, the
impact of aid on the change of the capital-labour ratio will
vanish. If f = n the economy arrives at a constant capital-labour
ratio as in the closed model, but its level is higher than in the
closed model. This can best be seen if aid is introduced into the
standard graphical presentation of the model (see Figure 1); this
case was already treated by Neher (1971, Chap.10) If f > n, the
share of aid in financing investment approaches unity and the
economy is dependent again. So the results for all three cases
11To obtain (6), divide both sides of (4’’) by K, subtract
n from both sides, and multiply both sides by k.
6of untied, lump-sum paid aid are very similar to those of the
Harrod-Domar model.
A simple way to take account of an adjustment of the savings
rate is to apply the golden rule to the case f = n:12
Max c = C/L = (Y + X - S)/L = AF(k,1) - nkA + X/L (7)
k
As X is independent of k, the golden rule produces the same
result as in the closed economy model:13
F1(k*,1) = n (8)
The same k* can only be reached at a lower steady state savings
rate s* (s. Figure 1). Thus, recalculation of the optimal savings
rate yields that aid is completely consumed, because savings per
labour efficiency unit s(F + X) is exactly as high as it was in
the closed economy model, i.e. nk*, and therefore interest and
wages are unchanged if compared to the closed model. So on the
background of this model we expect a decrease in the rate of
savings if aid is paid untied and lump sum. As this result is
efficient from the standpoint of per capita consumption
maximization, those who complain about it must have a different
objective function.
The point of criticism that poverty has not been alleviated
indicates that in the donor countries the well-being of the poor
is an essential aspect of their individual welfare
considerations. This can only be in contradiction to aggregate
consumption maximization if that aid is distributed in such a way
that the poor don’t benefit (see Nitsch 1986 on this point). If
the latter is expected by donors and the poor live on wage
income, the question rises whether aid can be tied in such a
manner as to raise wages. Clearly, such tying will be inefficient
under the goal of aggregate consumption maximization but
efficient under the goal of poverty alleviation in connection
with the assumption that the poor have jobs and live on wages and
won’t benefit in case of lump sum aid. So donors may have to
choose between the goals of aggregate consumption maximization
and poverty alleviation. An incentive scheme that yields higher
wages even if the receiving country behaves according to the
golden rule is introduced in the next section.
12C is the level of consumption and c is consumption per
head.
13A lower index i of F indicates a partial derivative with
respect to the i-th argument of the function F.
75. Distribution-oriented, income-dependent aid in the standard
neoclassical growth model.
If aid is paid according to (2) we find
.
K = s(1 + x)Y (4’’’)
and the central differential equation becomes
. ^
k = (K - n)k = s(1 + x)Y/AL - nk = s(1 + x)F(k,1)-nk (6’)
A graph analogous to Figure 1 shows that there is no long-run
impact on the rate of growth, but the steady state value of k is
larger than in the closed model (see Figure 2). Now the essential
question is whether or not the application of the golden rule
will destroy this impact as under untied, lump sum aid. Now the
golden rule problem is:
Max C/L ≡ c = (Y + X - S)/L = AF(k,1) + xF(k,1)A - nkA
k
instead of (8) one finds (compare Figure 3)
(1 + x)F1(k**, 1) = n (8’)
The steady state of (6’) under a golden rule savings ratio s** is
characterized by
s**(1 + x)F(k**, 1) = nk** (9)
where k** is determined through (8’) and the last equation
determines s** given x. In the model with untied, lump sum paid
aid the optimal capital-labour ratio was determined by (8) and
is denoted as k* in Figure 3. Its level is higher in this model
of income-dependent aid because F1 is lower; this is due to the
fact that production is more profitable now, because each unit
of output yields an additional unit of aid, which produces an
incentive to employ more capital to increase output. This higher
value of k** has two important consequences: firstly, because of
w = F2A the real wage, w, is higher (w** > w*); secondly, at the
same level of aid in the two models the aggregate per capita
consumption is lower, which can be shown as follows: at the same
level of X the level of per capita consumption in the two golden
rule programs depends on F(k,1) - nk. This difference is
maximized at F1 = n and this is exactly the result of the golden
8rule under untied, lump-sum aid. In case of income-dependent aid
it does not hold and therefore per capita consumption must be
lower. The difference is a usual excess burden produced by the
distortion x. If donors want to raise real wages because they
cannot ensure that the poor benefit in case of untied, lump sum
aid, tying of aid to output is a means of ensuring higher wage
income. If profits are also raised, there will be no incentive
for anyone to object to the payment of aid. Profits will be
increased because F1k will be higher at k** > k* than at k* which
can be seen as follows:14
>
d(F1k)/dk = F1 + F11k = 0
<
implies
>
1 = - F11k/F1;
<
multiplying both sides by F/F2AL ≡ y/F2 and making use of -F11k =
F21 yields
>
(F/AL)/F2 = y/(w/A) = F21F/F1F2AL ≡ 1/σ
<
The last term is the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution
σ ≡ (dk/dω)ω/k where ω = w/r. This condition can be rewritten as
>
σ = wL/Y
<
If the elasticity of substitution is higher than the share of
wages, profits will increase and therefore profit earners will
have no incentive to oppose receiving aid. Clearly, they may
prefer non-tied aid, but this is assumed here to be a decision
of donors. If this condition is not fulfilled, the acceptance of
aid may pose political problems. Unless there are other means
of depriving wage earners of their increased income, which is
rather unlikely under a very imperfect tax administration, our
model shows that aid which is paid in proportion to the income
of the receiving country will make them better off than if the
aid is paid lump sum, i.e. at an independent growth rate. This
implies that even with golden rule recalculation, the market
mechanism - once it works as perfect as neoclassical economists
believe it will after all liberalizations - ensures that wages
14If a lower index i of function F appears twice it
indicates the second partial derivative with respect to the i-th
argument of function F.
9will rise and poverty alleviated. Supposedly, in a model with
unemployment, wages will rise less and employment will be
increased. The result, that wage and profit income may be higher
if compared to the lump sum payment of aid although there is an
inefficiency is due to the fact that the incentive scheme
produces an incentive for higher investment under a golden rule.
Figure 3 graphically summarizes the comparison of steady states.
6. Conclusion
One current practice in development cooperation, that of tying
aid to exports of goods and services from donors at the micro
level, may be interpreted as a form even worse than lump sum
payment of aggregate aid. If this practice were dropped and if
instead an income-dependent aid scheme were introduced at the
macro level, donors could achieve either an increase in the
growth rate if the economy works as a Harrod-Domar model, or an
increase in real wages if the economy works as a neoclassical
model. In the latter case, the recipient economy would neither
become entirely dependent nor would the impact of aid vanish due
to recalculation of the savings ratio as in case of lump-sum aid.
Possibly, future research will find even more effective variables
than income upon which aid could be made dependent. 15
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